Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis Mili Note: Unfortunately, every distinction has two terms, every argument has a counter-argument, and consciousness can only focus on one of these at a time. In other words, the dialectical method involves the notion that the form of historical movement, process or progress, is the result of conflicting opposites.
Hegel says that aufheben has a doubled meaning: The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self-sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublates itself, or both cancels and preserves itself, as it pushes on to or passes into its opposite.
Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing.
As Hegel Hegelian dialectic thesis anti-thesis in the Phenomenology, such an argument is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results.
There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations.
Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity see, e. The nature of the determinations themselves drives or forces them to pass into their opposites. This sense of necessity—the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his Hegelian dialectic thesis anti-thesis as a kind of logic.
Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside.
Instead, the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations.
The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up. Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples.
We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this: Figure 1 Later concepts thus replace, but also preserve, earlier concepts.
Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate themselves—they pass into their others because of some weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions.
There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead them to pass into their opposites. Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier determinations. It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the universal.
As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. SL-M 54 Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they unify or are built out of earlier determinations, and include those earlier determinations as part of their definitions.
Indeed, many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as literally surrounding earlier ones cf.
Moreover, because the process develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the process. This Absolute is the highest concept or form of universality for that subject matter.
It is the thought or concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject matter. We can picture the entire system like this cf. Figure 3 Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely scientific.
The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content.
Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content.
The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence Being and then taken as absence Nothingor taken as absence Nothing and then taken as presence Being.
Becoming cancels or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition."Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".
The triad thesis, antithesis, synthesis is often used to describe the thought of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel stresses the paradoxical nature of consciousness; he knows that the mind wants to know the whole truth, but that it cannot think without drawing a distinction.
The Hegelian dialectic is usually presented in a threefold manner. Thesis, the originating matter at hand, giving rise to a reaction, antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis, and the tension between the two being resolved by means of synthesis. Although the dialectic does not necessarily take the triadic form of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, the various parts of the simplest examples can easily be matched to each of the triad's components.
The other answer here picks out a fundamental ex. • Hegel’s chief dialectical format consists of a two-concept thesis, a two-concept antithesis, and a two-concept synthesis that borrows one concept from the thesis and one from the antithesis.
• All dialectics are analogically based on the Christian separation-and-return myth: the dialectic separates from and returns to a thesis concept.
The Hegelian dialectic cannot be mechanically applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis.